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The approach to ethical and political reflection from the point of view of 
the forms of life and of the relations human beings establish with the other 
living beings, with the environment, and with the various biological, social and 
technological processes opens up a rather peculiar and fruitful philosophical 
dimension. The approach of forms of life, as we might call it, falls within a 
wider and diversified family of conceptions grounded on the appeal to 
practices, relations, and reflection, which can be conceived of as alternative to 
approaches which hinge on the moral and political subject variously 
understood, as for example in the case of the classical pair of conceptions of 
utilitarianism and Kantian-social contract theories. A similar contrast 
informed a recent portion of the philosophical literature of the analytic 
tradition, which in the 1980s saw the contraposition between theorists and 
anti-theorists in ethics1. The very concept of anti-theory comprised of rather 
diverse conceptions including: the revival of the perspective of the virtues, 
which rejects the possibility to have an exhaustive list of the criteria of moral 
excellence in advance, calling in its place for a (perceptive, rational, and other 
kinds of) capacity to make distinctions, which can be accounted for only by 
calling in cause the very circumstances in which they find application; the idea 
that moral reflection does not necessarily take the very shape of a theory 
presenting us with a hierarchy of principles from which deriving the particular 
prescription to be applied to the specific case at hand; the importance of 
concrete communities, where moral reflection takes the shape of accepted (or 
1 S.G. Clarke, E. Simpson (eds.), Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism, New York, 
State University of New York Press, 1989. 
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contested) shared practices. Authors coming from different orientations were 
grouped together in this light, such as John McDowell, Annette Baier, Bernard 
Williams, Alasdair MacIntyre e Richard Rorty, among others. Differently from 
this first wave of criticism of normative ethical and political theory, which 
mostly interested the English speaking philosophical community and what 
could be still called analytic philosophy, we are now in a different phase which 
has treasured other (more or less kindred) philosophical experiences. It should 
perhaps be noticed that the anti-theory critique has been subsequently 
developed by moral particularism2, although particularism (especially inspired 
by some classical articles by McDowell from the 1970s and 80s) has been 
presented as part of the new course of analytic meta-ethics, which does not 
seem to be interested in working with a critical register capable of inviting the 
contribution of different philosophical lines. Other philosophical experiences 
are indeed more significant in this respect: in particular, feminist and women’s 
ethics, as well as the ethics of care in its various declinations; Wittgensteinian 
moral philosophy as it has been developed by authors such as Cora Diamond 
and most importantly in the work of Stanley Cavell and in what he calls moral 
perfectionism. To these lines we should add the recent upswing of pragmatism 
and critical theory. 
Now, we might ask why the easy negative labels: anti-theory in ethics, or 
alternative ethics. A reply can be offered by taking a look at the longer 
tradition of ethical and political philosophy well before the events of the 
twentieth century, that is back to early modernity. In particular, between the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century it is easy to register how the dominant line 
is the one of modern natural law and the social contract tradition, to which 
Hume and the Scottish Enlightenment represent the main, yet minor, 
alternative. The dominant line holds that the very task of moral and political 
reflection is that of elaborating theoretical devices which allow to establish the 
political order. Such theoretical devices appear still necessary today (e.g., the 
notions of contract, rights and political obligation). It is precisely this 
conception that will be reprised in twentieth-century normative theory. Yet this 
conception was abandoned by a new tradition in the nineteenth century, with 
Hegel representing the quintessential classical thinker who re-thought ethics, 
politics, and the law, carving out for them a space fashioned after the 
understanding of the human forms of reflective habitation in the world (as we 
might want to put it). We could also say, however, that Hegel lies right at the 
origins of a way of thinking that, together with his great critics – such as 
2 See for example the recent volume edited by S.G. Chappell, Intuition, Theory, and Anti-
Theory in Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015. 
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Kierkegaard and hence twentieth-century existentialism – and his internal 
critics or heirs, in their own way – such as Marx and twentieth-century critical 
theory –, represents an alternative approach to ethical and political thought; 
such an alternative seems to be interested in addressing different questions 
with a different language quite unlike the questions and language of the 
tradition which up until Kant, despite the great many distances, tells of a 
common landscape in philosophy3. 
We are now in the position to try to draw some conclusions about these 
complex events. The big division between the line stemming from Hegel to 
existentialism, and to Adorno and beyond, and the line which goes from the 
classical thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth century to Rawls and 
Hare, among others, somewhat looses its edge. The division is in fact 
smoothened because there are approaches impossible to reduce to each camp 
– such as the ethics springing from Wittgenstein, the ethics of virtue which
goes back to Aristotle and Hume, the ethics of care, pragmatism, and some
recent outcomes of critical theory – that do not need to define themselves in
negative terms. Furthermore, these approaches make it possible to read from
their own point of view the allegedly dominant theoretical perspective,
variously characterized (by privileging the social contract, the elaboration of a
normative theory, or transcendental institutional theories as Amartya Sen calls
them). Two telling examples of this re-interpretative operation are Martha
Nussbaum’s capability approach, which witnessed many formulations, critical
of the tradition of social contract but working in the wake of political
liberalism and thus aiming at addressing the questions of modern social
contract thinkers. The other example is Cavell’s moral perfectionism, which is
part of his wider conception of the philosophy of the ordinary, reprising with
force the picture and conception of the social contract (Rousseau’s in
particular). These examples show how the approaches grounded on the appeal
to practices, relations, and reflection have the independence and strength to
employ and rethink other traditions within their own.
It needs to be mentioned that, together with the said great division, other 
big, more recent divisions crumbled as well, such as that between analytic and 
continental philosophy. This is not the place to even scratch the surface of  this 
complex issue. For example, it is not at all clear what this distinction means in 
the first place, and what it means today might not be very useful to investigate 
the very origins of analytic philosophy, both with reference to the contrast 
3 R. Geuss, Outside Ethics, in Id., Outside Ethics, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
2005, pp. 40-66. I discuss these themes in my Etica. I classici, le teorie e le linee evolutive, 
Torino, Einaudi, 2015, in particular Ch. 12. 
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between those who were focused on the analysis of the proposition (Moore and 
Russell, say) and those who instead considered practices (the later 
Wittgenstein), and with reference to the contrast on the very role of science 
(Wittgenstein vs. Quine). My point here is however quite simple: besides the 
various uses of the notion of analytic philosophy, there are nowadays many 
important and fertile philosophical approaches taking away virtually any 
intellectual appeal from the operations of exclusions through which the two 
parties distance themselves from the styles, methods, and agendas they deem 
inadequate. In some cases, because of their versatile and productive character, 
these approaches complicate our attempts to locate them in one of the two 
opposing camps, while in others they show the fertility of their crossbreeding 
(even if there are cases in which it is indeed appropriate to indicate certain 
styles and questions as analytic, and yet these cases greatly differ from each 
other so to forbid any generalization: they in fact tell nothing about how to 
legislate on the way to do analytic philosophy or on how to do philosophy in 
general).  
Approaches grounded on forms of life and coexistences come to the scene 
in this moment in philosophical culture. They circumscribe some of the 
approaches referring to practices, relations, and reflection, and do it in rather 
peculiar ways. They are bottom-up approaches, starting from the reflection on 
practices and forms of life in the wake of Aristotle, Hume, Dewey and 
Wittgenstein4. We can indeed individuate some characteristic features of this 
family of approaches. The notion of form of life recurs in them with different 
meanings. (1) In the first place, it indicates the relationship of interdependence 
making possible the preservation of individual lives. The idea of 
interdependence can be explored in various ways. The ethics of care makes it 
the very centerpiece of its approach: according to it, the support needed by 
people is the support of those relations in which they are involved; but the 
maintenance and support of the (natural, ecological, social, economical) world 
is the maintenance and support of a net of relations as well. This activity of 
maintenance and support requires specific qualities such as the attention and 
the capacity to seize what is not visible, what we don’t want to see – qualities to 
be understood as themselves practices or virtues. Furthermore, forms of life 
feature in the Wittgensteinian line as well, as bustling knots of relations which 
on the one hand constitute the very background of conduct and thought, and 
on the other represent the relations earned personally, which call for a 
movement, a change, a mobilization of those aspects of the self fixated in 
4 For this conception, see P. Donatelli (ed.), Forme di vita e modi di vivere / Forms of Life 
and Ways of Being, “Iride”, 29 (2016), n. 77, and in particular the Premessa, pp. 79-81. 
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mechanisms and automatisms. Both perspectives call in question the model of 
the political subject addressing her needs in order to preserving and 
developing herself (as it is for example with social contract theories). They in 
fact thematize the priority of the relations which make possible the very idea 
of a subject with her own needs and interests, and transform the concept of 
scarce resources necessary to fulfill the needs of the subject, which themselves 
become subjects in various relations (environments, non-human animals, and 
those human beings themselves who we don’t see but from whom we depend 
in various ways). 
(2) Secondly, the notion of forms of life indicates the relations of coexistence 
between living beings and biological and social processes. Some central lines 
of cultural anthropology profitably thematized the very idea of coexistence: it 
challenged those conceptions ruled by the notions of identity and otherness. 
Philippe Descola has shown for example that almost all traditional societies 
did not possess a system of distribution and an economy of the relations 
between humans and the world (plants, animals, natural environments) which 
make justice to the separation between human beings and the outer world5. 
What we have instead is a regime of coexistence of various kinds of subjects. A 
different way of developing the idea of coexistence has been advanced in the 
field of the life sciences: in this case the challenge is the separation of the 
biological from the cultural. In this case as well, both lines of research offer 
interesting lessons about how to rethink the given political scheme of the 
human being with her needs and requirements, which prompts the 
constitution of the political order understood as a particular system of 
interdependence between humans (as in the model of social contract), however 
concealing in this way a rich and variegated set of different interdependences 
among humans themselves understood as ecosystems and between humans 
and other individualities living in a relation of coexistence.  
The authors of the present monographic section tackle these themes from a 
variety of directions. Rossella Bonito Oliva deals with the question of the 
world-pictures working as the background of human lives, individuating the 
extinguishing of this very horizon in common sense. Caterina Botti reprises 
the ethics of care, in which morality is seen as a relational texture of attention 
to others in their particularity, and rethinks bioethics accordingly. Piergiorgio 
Donatelli explores the notion of vulnerability and relates it to the approach of 
forms of life, pointing to the Wittgensteinian line as a fertile perspective to 
develop these concepts and their connections. Elena Gagliasso problematizes 
 
5 P. Descola, Beyond Nature and Culture, transl. Janet Lloyd, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 2014. 
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the concept of an organism’s environment, reinterpreting it as a bundle of 
relations in which various explicative dimensions (biological, historical, and 
cultural) are at stake. Sandra Laugier reprises the ethics of care in order to 
subvert the autonomy of the subject and to defend a political conception which 
moves from the responsibility informing the relations of care and the 
responsible relations of coexistence. Stefano Petrucciani investigates the 
concept of alienation: in the recent discussion in critical theory, alienation 
indicates various ways for the individual to be disconnected from reality, 
overlooking however the structural dimension belonging to the classical 
Marxist conception. Elena Pulcini develops the theme of those emotions 
characteristic of the relations of care, bringing into focus the emotions 
involved in the care for the distant ones which is distinctive of a globalized 
world. 
